In the following weeks, Mr. X kept talking to awestruck MONUSCO intelligence analysts.
He described himself as a dashing special agent: negotiating arms deals with Europeans, leading commando raids in Uganda, and even driving a motorcycle loaded with land mines from Somalia to Congo. He said ADF was working with half a dozen terrorist groups including al-Qaida, al-Shabab, Hezbollah, and Boko Haram. When asked who was making ADF's crude bombs, he first said Moroccan and Malian men, but later changed his story and claimed it was three white people, including a German woman.
To be sure, Mr. X was a creative storyteller, but even more fascinating than his tales of Periodically the crowd would shout or applaud, adding to the theatrical atmosphere.
The victim in this case-Congolese army Colonel Mamadou Ndala-was a national hero.
In November 2013, Ndala had led the beleaguered Congolese army to its greatest victory in years, against a powerful and widely despised rebel group called M23, which was backed by the Rwandan government. In the wake of that triumph, people chanted Ndala's name when he appeared in public and wore T-shirts emblazoned with his image. A month after the victory, the army command reassigned Ndala to Beni to launch a military operation against an enigmatic, Islamist rebel group called the Allied Democratic Forces, or ADF.
On the morning of Jan. 2, 2014, as Ndala was traveling north from Beni, assailants lying in ambush fired rocket-propelled grenades and shot AK-47s at his jeep, instantly killing him.
Government spokesmen first blamed bandits and then faulted corrupt army officers. But many people believed the government in Kinshasa had ordered Ndala's assassination, because he had become too popular. When the trial began, the government shifted its story once again, claiming ADF rebels had killed Ndala in collaboration with a rogue army officer named Colonel Birotcho Nzanzu. The prosecution's case was weak, but drama and politics drove this trial, not the pursuit of justice.
On a hot day in November 2014, one month into the murder trial, the prosecution summoned a surprise anonymous witness, whom they called "Mr. X." Up walked a man, covered head to toe, to take the stand. He wore a flowing white djellaba, had a scarf wrapped around his head, and sported sunglasses. He took a seat and told the court his story.
Mr. X said until recently he had been a senior ADF commander and had inside knowledge Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/world-policy-journal/article-pdf/33/2/91/504572/0330091.pdf by guest
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ularly supplied by agents living in nearby towns and cities. Within these camps, ADF had its own banking system, medical clinics, schools, and police force. Mukulu was chief judge of a court system that imposed punishments like stoning for adultery and having one's mouth sewn shut for speaking during prayer. Mukulu kept telling his population that ADF's ultimate objective was to take over Uganda, but he made no clear effort to do so and likely gave up that goal in order to preserve his forest fiefdom.
Around 2010, for reasons that remain unclear, ADF's leaders became highly secretive and insular. In contrast to other rebel groups in the DRC, which promoted themselves on Twitter and Facebook, ADF stayed away from social media. To discourage people from escaping and providing information about the group's activities, ADF beheaded or crucified people caught trying to flee.
The Ugandan government occasionally stated that ADF was working with al-Qaida and al-Shabab, but with reliable information about ADF almost nonexistent, these claims appeared to have had more to do with Uganda's interest in being part of the U.S.-led "war on terror" than with any actual links to terrorist groups. All anyone really knew was that around 2,000 men, women, and children were living in several fortified forest camps under Mukulu's version of Sharia.
In mid-January 2014, the Congolese army launched the operation against ADF that Ndala had been planning when he was assassinated.
As government soldiers pushed into the forest toward ADF's camps, the fighting was intense and often at close range. Rebels shouted "Allahu derring-do was the fact that MONUSCO's analysts believed him. These analysts made Mr. X the prism through which they understood ADF and violence in the Beni area, and as a result the mission's response to a series of brutal massacres around the time of the murder trial was passive and ineffective. Their misplaced faith in Mr. X also led them to make the naïve and illadvised decision to provide Mr. X to the Congolese government for the Ndala murder trial.
The strange story of Mr. X sheds light on the emerging role of intelligence in U.N. peacekeeping operations, but it is also a warning about the unpredictable effects of intelligence failures.
FOREST DYSTOPIA
The ADF are one of the least understood rebel We were practicing what intelligence analysts call asset validation. That is, by showing photos and asking fundamental questions, we were making sure these people were credible and had actually been with ADF. This process helped us weed out several people who lied about having been kidnapped by ADF, probably because they thought they were going to get some assistance from the U.N. Many of the ex-combatants also lied to us, most likely to conceal their own involvement in crimes, but with sustained contact over the course of several weeks, we earned the trust of a few key ex-rebels, and gained fresh insights into ADF.
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We learned that Mukulu had disappeared in April with about 30 senior commanders and most of his family. The ex-rebels told us the names of the other commanders who were still in the forest, including the identities of the two men making ADF's crude bombs. From the documents we analyzed, we discovered that people in London, England, had been sending money via Western Union to ADF agents in eastern Congo. What we did not find-from any of our interviews, documents, or visits to ADF camps-was evidence that ADF was working with any foreign terrorist organizations.
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
In August 2014, Mr. X appeared at a MONUS-CO base 36 miles from Beni, carrying little besides stories about ADF and its terrorist links. After about an hour, I had heard enough. I thought again about challenging him, but decided against it; I regret that decision now, because it might have dispelled the aura of credibility that came to surround Mr. X and prevented him from testifying in the Ndala murder trial.
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As I packed up, Mr. X said he had something important he wanted to tell me: ADF is bringing people to the DRC from Boko Haram, Mali, and Afghanistan. ADF has a "new plan" to turn the DRC into "northern Mali."
When I left the apartment, a man was standing next to the armed guards, waiting for me to leave so he could deliver Mr. X's hot lunch.
GROUPTHINK
After I interviewed Mr. X, I warned the G2 and JMAC that he was a liar, but by that time, his stories had settled into the minds of MONUSCO's I heard more about Mr. X's stories, and incredible as they sounded to me, the fact that MO-NUSCO's analysts believed them pushed me to interview him myself.
I visited Mr. X on Sept. 2, 2014, at a MO-NUSCO camp a few miles outside the city of Goma. After getting special permission to talk to him from MONUSCO's chief of military intelligence, I was led to a door guarded by two Indian peacekeepers armed with rifles and wearing light blue helmets and flak jackets. I entered an apartment and greeted Mr. X, who was healthy and alert, around 40 years old, and eager to talk.
He started out by telling me that as head of recruitment for ADF, he had personally recruited more than 800 Ugandan men, all of whom had served in the Ugandan army, but that he did not recruit women or children, who were too difficult to transport to ADF's forest camps.
This contradicted the testimonies of the Ugandan ADF veterans I had interviewed-none of whom had prior military experience-but also failed to account for the women and children who told me they were recruited or forced to join ADF. I knew what Mr. X was telling me was untrue, but decided not to confront him, which, in retrospect, was probably a mistake. In such a context, the potential for intelligence failure is great, but because the quality of U.N.
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intelligence is poorly understood, its frequency and severity is unknown.
